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INSURANCE - REQUIREMENT THAT INSURED'S BREACH
OF AIRCRAFT INSURANCE POLICY CONTRIBUTE TO Loss FOR
INSURANCE COMPANY TO AVOID LIABILITY - Under Texas
law, when an insurance company pleads an exclusion, an
insured party seeking to recover under the policy has the
burden of proving that its breach of the insurance policy
did not contribute to the loss. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Last Days Evangelical Association, 783 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir.
1986).
On July 28, 1982, a Cessna 414 crashed near Lindale,
Texas.' Last Days Evangelical Association (Last Days)
had leased the plane in February, 1982, from WilliamJen-
kins (Jenkins), doing business as Junk Air, Inc. (Junk Air).2
The pilot, Don Burmeister (Burmeister), and his eleven
'Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Last Days Evangelical Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1234, 1235 (5th
Cir. 1986).
2 Id at 1236. The name "Last Days Evangelical Association" apparently cap-
tured the court's imagination. The opinion begins:
The evidence in the record does not disclose whether any augurers
counselled otherwise when Last Days Evangelical Association de-
cided to lease a Cessna 414 from William Jenkins' Junk Air. Nor
does the record disclose whether the Fates chuckled vindictively
when Ideal Mutual Insurance Company insured the airplane. Be
that as it may, the relationship between Junk Air and Last Days
ended tragically....
Id at 1235. The first footnote of the opinion quotes a long passage from Shake-
speare'sJulius Caesar in which Caesar's wife tries to convince him not to go to the
Senate because there have been reports of terrifying omens. Id at 1235 n.1. Cae-
sar's response to Calphurnia includes this passage:
It seems to me most strange that men should fear,
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come.
W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 11 ii. 35-37 (Signet Classic Shakespeare 1972). At
least one of the passengers on Last Days' Cessna 414 also had no fear of death. In
one of his songs, Keith Green wrote:
I can't wait to get to Heaven,
Where You'll wipe away all my tears,
In six days You created everything,
But You've been working on Heaven 10,000 years.
K. Green, I Can't Wait to Get to Heaven, THE PRODIGAL SON.
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passengers, died in the crash.8 Ideal Mutual Insurance
Company (Ideal) insured the plane, and Last Days
promptly filed a claim under the policy.4
Ideal initiated a declaratory judgment action in Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, naming
Last Days, Jenkins and Junk Air as defendants. 5 Ideal pled
that, due to several exclusionary clauses, the policy did
not cover the accident.6 Rejecting all of Ideal's arguments
but one, the district court found coverage lacking because
the policy required Burmeister to have 1045 "total logged
hours" of flight, and defendants had failed to produce the
requisite time records. 7 Ruling that the airplane lease es-
tablished Jenkins as Last Days' agent for the purpose of
insuring the plane,8 the court attributed Jenkins' knowl-
Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1236. Keith Green, one of those killed in the crash, was
a popular Christian musician and founder of Last Days Ministries. Rabey, Keith
Green, 11 Others Killed in Plane Crash, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 2, 1982, at 47.
Green converted to Christianity in 1975 after travelling through the drug culture
and various philosophies. Id. at 51. Last Days grew out of Keith and Melody
Green's habit of opening their home to those needing a place to stay. Id The
ministry had a unique "whatever you can afford" policy, mailing out thousands of
free copies of albums and literature. Id Keith considered himself an "elbow" in
the body of Christ, nudging people to "get right with God." Id. at 50. Also killed
in the crash were Keith's son,Josiah David, 3, daughter, Bethany Grace, 2, and the
eight members of the John Smalley family who had stopped to visit the Greens on
their way to begin a church in Connecticut. Id. at 47. Litigation arising out of the
crash resulted in legal fees and settlements costing Last Days around $445,000.
Letter from Melody Green to Supporters (Feb. 13, 1986).
Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1235-36.
. id. at 1236.
ld
7 Id. The disputed exclusion provides:
This policy does not apply:.. .2. to any occurrence or to any loss or
damage occurring while the aircraft is operated in flight by other
than the pilot or pilots set forth under Item 7 of the Declarations.
Item 7 reads:
PILOT CLAUSE. Only the following pilot or pilots.., will operate
the Aircraft in flight: SEE ENDORSEMENT # 1.
Endorsement * 1 provides in part:
It is hereby understood and agreed that Item 7 of the Policy declara-
tions shall be completed to read as follows: ... Don Burmeser (sic]
... having a minimum of 1045 total logged flying hours....
Id. at 1236-37.
9 Id. at 1236 n.2. The parties hotly contested the agency issue on appeal. Last
Days contended that Jenkins was not its agent and that Ideal dealt with Jenkins
and Last Days as co-principals. Brief for Appellant Last Days Evangelical Associa-
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edge of the exclusionary term to Last Days. 9
Agreeing with the district court that the clause requir-
ing Burmeister to have 1045 hours of logged flying time
created an unambiguous condition precedent to coverage
under the policy,10 the Fifth Circuit nevertheless reversed
and remanded the case on the basis of a recently decided
Texas Supreme Court opinion, Puckett v. United States Fire
Insurance Co.' Under Puckett, for an insurance company to
tion, Inc. at 5 [hereinafter Last Days' Brief]. Therefore, Jenkins' knowledge of the
policy terms was not attributable to Last Days. Id at 13. Ideal responded that the
lease clearly supported the finding of agency, as well as Last Days' conduct in
allowingJenkins to solicit insurance on its behalf. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appel-
lant Ideal Mutual Insurance Company at 13-14 [hereinafter Ideal's Brief]. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding of agency on the basis of the
aircraft lease. Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1236 n.2.
a Last Days' Brief, supra note 8, at 13. Apparently, the false statement that
Burmeister had "1045 total logged hours" found its way into the policy through
no fault of either Last Days or Ideal. See Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1237. An insurance
broker, Aviation Assurance Agency by Dickens ("Assurance"), arranged the insur-
ance purchase. I at 1236. Ideal sent an application binder, which was com-
pleted by Assurance and signed by Jenkins, requiring a figure for the "total
logged hours" of each pilot. Id. at 1237. Assurance sent a pilot experience form
to Burmeister asking for "total hours" rather than "logged" hours. Id. Assurance
apparently failed to convey to Burmeister that the policy required "logged"
hours. Id Burmeister filled out the form indicating that he had 1045 total hours.
Idr Assurance returned the form with the application binder to Ideal. Id Ideal
then incorporated the 1045 figure into Endorsement * l's statement that
Burmeister had 1045 logged hours. Id. Logged flight time differs from total flight
time and consists of only those hours of flight of which a record exists. Logged
time is given greater credence. Id at 1239 (citing Stewart v. Vanguard Ins. Co.,
603 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Tex. 1980)). Many of Burmeister's flying hours were
not logged because they were obtained during military training. Id at 1237.
Since Assurance was Last Days' agent, the insured could not use Assurance's mis-
take against Ideal. Id at 1240 n.6.
lo Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1238. Last Days argued that the clause was ambiguous
because one could reasonably construe it as a mere description of Burmeister and,
alternatively, that even if the clause created a condition precedent, Burmeister's
pilot experience form would satisfy the exclusion. Id. The court rejected both
arguments, holding that to be reasonable, a construction must give meaning to
the disputed language and that the obvious purpose of the clause was to provide
"a warranty that the risk [Ideal] insured initially would be the same risk it paid out
on." Id. at 1238-39. Pilot experience is an element of risk and "both the risk and
the premium will be higher if the pilot is Wrong Way Corrigan instead of Chuck
Yeager." Id. at 1239. Perhaps the most quotable portion of the opinion reads:
"As necessity is the mother of invention, so is ambiguity the father of multiple
reasonable constructions, and where lawyers are involved, one never lacks an ea-
ger parent of either gender." Id at 1238.
" 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984) (cited in Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240-41).
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avoid liability on an aviation policy, the breach of contract
by the insured must contribute to the accident.' 2 Puckett
did not, however, reach the question of who has the bur-
den of proving that the policy breach did or did not con-
tribute to the loss.13 The Fifth Circuit, in remanding the
case for trial, held that under Texas law, when an insur-
ance company pleads an exclusion, an insured party seek-
ing to recover under the policy must prove that its breach
of the insurance policy did not contribute to the loss. 14
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The majority of courts addressing the issue have held
that for an insurance company to avoid liability on the ba-
sis of a condition precedent in an insurance policy, there
need be no causal connection between the actual loss and
the excluded risk.15 For instance, in Schepps Grocer Supply,
12 Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240.
13 Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 937. The parties in Puckett stipulated to the lack of
causation. Jd
14 Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240. The court seemed to feel some regret over the
opinion, saying "[a]lthough we might prefer to do otherwise, we believe that were
the Texas Supreme Court to address this question, it would place the burden,....
on the insured to prove that the failure to comply with the terms of the policy in
no way contributed to the loss." Id.
I5 See Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1969) (under Ken-
tucky law, liability excluded where pilot flew in low visibility weather in violation
of FAA regulations); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Polytech Indus., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1058(M.D. Ga. 1987)(Georgia law requires no causal connection between crash and
violation of policy for insurance company to avoid coverage); Edmonds v. United
States, 492 F. Supp. 970 (D. Mass. 1980) (liability excluded where plane had not
received biennial flight review), afd, 642 F.2d 877 (Ist Cir. 1981); Di Santo v.
Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (liability excluded
where mechanic flying helicopter did not meet qualifications of policy pilot
clause); National Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Bequette, 280 F. Supp. 842 (D. Alaska
1968) (liability excluded where pilot violated policy by carrying passengers), afd,
429 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Meyer, 192
Cal. App. 3d 866, 237 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1987) (coverage excluded where pilot
lacked medical certificate); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bright, 106 Cal. App. 3d
282, 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1980) (liability excluded where plane had been used to
illegally transport marijuana); Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Casualty Co., 113 Ga.
App. 572, 148 S.E.2d 925 (1966) (liability excluded where pilot had no medical
certificate and violated FAA regulations); Western Food Prod. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins.
Co., 10 Kan. App. 2d 375, 699 P.2d 579 (1985) (liability excluded where pilot of
plane not listed in policy's pilot clause); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. West
Monroe Charter Serv., Inc., 504 So. 2d 93 (La. Ct. App.) (coverage excluded
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Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co. ,16 an insurance company sought
to avoid liability, arguing that the insured party violated
the policy. 17 The policy excluded coverage if the pilot fly-
ing the plane lacked an FAA multi-engine rating.'8  At
trial, the insured introduced evidence that the pilot flying
the plane at the time of the fatal crash possessed the skills
necessary to pass the FAA test, but failed to do so only
because he could locate no FAA examiner before the
flight. '9 Affirming the trial court's judgment for the insur-
ance company, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that
the absence of a cause and effect relationship between the
pilot's failure to obtain a multi-engine rating and the loss
was immaterial. 20 To require causation would, in the
court's opinion, create a new contract between the
parties.21
where pilot lacked valid medical certificate), writ denied, 505 So. 2d 1141 (La.
1987); United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Rex Ray Corp., 15 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,625 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1979) (no causal connection required between
loss and violation of pilot hours clause); Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co.,
326 Mich. 115, 40 N.W.2d 90 (1949) (liability excluded where student pilot vio-
lated pilot certificate by carrying passengers); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550
S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (liability excluded where student pilot violated
pilot certificate by carrying passengers); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v.
Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973) (liability excluded where
pilot lacked valid medical certificate); Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 99
N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983) (liability excluded where plane lacked valid airwor-
thiness certificate because annual inspection not performed); Bellefonte Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Alfa Aviation, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 544, 300 S.E.2d 877 (1983)
(coverage excluded where pilot lacked valid medical certificate), afld, 310 N.C.
471, 312 S.E.2d 426 (1984); Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 54 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d
421 (1981) (liability excluded where plane lacked valid airworthiness certificate
because annual inspection not performed), petition for review denied, 644 P.2d 1128
(Or. 1982); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Lynpal, Inc., 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,067
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)(coverage excluded where pilot lacked valid medical
certificate).
'a 545 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
17 Id The insurance company also sought reimbursement of more than
$54,000 paid to the lienholder of the insured aircraft and a declaration that it was
not required to defend the insured in any action arising out of the crash. Id The
trial court granted all relief requested by the plaintiff. Id
'i Id. at 14.
19 Id. Three days prior to the crash, the pilot had taken a three-hour check
flight with his instructor in preparation for the test and his instructor recom-
mended him for a multi-engine rating. Id
Id. at 16.
" Id The court treated the issue of whether there must be a causal link be-
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In contrast to the majority position represented by
Schepps Grocer Supply, a number of jurisdictions have
adopted the rule that causation must exist to avoid liabil-
ity.22 One commentator calls the causation requirement
tween the policy breach and the loss as purely a matter of construing the policy.
Id. Thus, no causation requirement existed under the language of this particular
contract. Id. The court did not consider imposing the causation requirement as a
matter of public policy. Compare with Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938.
22 Migues v. Universal Airways, Inc., 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,250 (S.D. Miss.
1982) (insurer must show causal connection between policy breach and loss to
avoid liability); Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204 (D.
Mont. 1981) (pilot's lack of medical certificate does not exclude liability where
causally unrelated to crash); American States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456
F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (fact that pilot flying plane was not listed in policy
would not exclude liability unless pilot error contributed to crash); Avemco Ins.
Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Haw. 1975) (pilot's lack of medical certificate
does not exclude liability where causally unrelated to crash); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (burden
on insured to show breach of pilot warranty increased hazard within meaning of
Florida statute); Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (lack
of airworthiness certificate did not void policy where pilot error caused crash),
petition for review denied sub noma. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Pickett, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla.
1982); Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985) (plane insured under Iowa statute where failure to maintain airworthiness
and medical certificates did not contribute to loss); South Carolina Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Broach, 291 S.C. 349, 353 S.E.2d 450 (1987) (burden on insurer to show
causal connection between unapproved flight by student pilot and crash); South
Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977) (pilot's lack of
medical certificate does not exclude liability where causally unrelated to crash).
One of the cases cited in Puckett as supporting the majority rule was O'Connor
v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 661 P.2d 1181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). On appeal, the
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court ruling, but adopted a modified
form of the causation rule. O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 285-
86 (Colo. 1985). The court held that:
The use of the equitable doctrine against forfeiture of coverage to
override clear and unambiguous forfeiture provisions in an insur-
ance policy should not be invoked except under the most compelling
circumstances. Where the relationship of the regulation to safety is
not apparent, the insured has the burden of showing the absence of
such a relationship. Furthermore, when the regulation is clearly or
implicitly safety-related, the application of the exclusion should be
precluded by public policy only when the insured can show that the
violation of the regulation was not a cause of the accident.
Id. at 286. The Colorado Supreme Court, like the Fifth Circuit in the present
case, placed the burden of proving causation on the insured party rather than the
insurance company. The Iowa "anti-technicality" statute also mandates that the
insured party bear the burden of proving its policy breach did not contribute to
the loss. IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 1949); see also Lees, 368 N.W.2d at 211-
12. Apparently, only Colorado and Iowa follow the rule adopted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Last Days.
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the "modem trend. ' 23 For example, the South Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the new approach in South Caro-
lina Insurance Co. v. Collins.24  An insurance company
brought suit to avoid liability for an airplane crash.25 The
parties stipulated that the pilot did not possess a valid
medical certificate at the time of the accident.26 Plaintiff
argued that this failure constituted a breach of the pol-
icy.27 The parties further stipulated that the lack of a
medical certificate did not contribute to the loss. 28 The
South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on an old line of
automobile insurance cases, held that the insurer must
demonstrate a causal connection between a breach of the
policy and the crash of the aircraft in order to avoid liabil-
ity.29 Adopting the rationale of the prior cases, the court
argued that parties to an insurance contract do not arbi-
trarily bar coverage under excluded conditions.30 Rather,
when drafting a policy, the insurance company desires to
relieve itself from liability for accidents caused by the ex-
cluded risk.31 Therefore, the requirement that breach of
the policy condition contribute to the loss can be seen as
implicit in the parties' agreement.3 2 Almost every case
adopting the causation requirement places the burden of
proving causation on the insurance company rather than
23 6AJ. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4146, at 439 (1972).
24 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
25 Collins, 237 S.E.2d at 358.
20Ia at 359. The parties stipulated that the pilot had a valid pilot certificate at
the time of the crash, but his two-year medical certificate lapsed three months
before the accident. Id.
Id. The pilot clause required that only named pilots "holding valid and effec-
tive pilot and medical certificates operate the aircraft." Id. at 360.
28 Id. at 359.
- rd at 360-62. The court relied on Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 166
S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932) and McGee v. Globe Indem. Co., 173 S.C. 380, 175
S.E. 849 (1934).
so Collins, 237 S.E.2d at 361-62.
3' Id
-2 Id.; see A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DIsPtrrEs § 6.07 (1982). This argu-
ment answers the objection that a causation requirement alters the parties' agree-
ment. See supra note 21 and infra note 49 and accompanying text for examples of
the objection.
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the insured party.38
Jurisdictions may impose the causation requirement by
statute as well as case law.34 Texas has long had an "anti-
technicality" statute, article 6.14 of the Insurance Code,
adopting the causation rule for personal property fire in-
surance policies.35 Without explaining their rationale,
Texas cases interpreting that statute have placed the bur-
den of proving causation on the insurance company. 6
In Puckett, the Texas Supreme Court for the first time
considered the causation requirement in the context of an
aircraft insurance policy. 7 United States Fire Insurance
Company brought a declaratory judgment action in Texas
state court seeking to avoid liability when a plane covered
by one of its policies crashed.38 The policy contained an
exclusion suspending coverage if the plane's "airworthi-
ness certificate [was] not in full force and effect."839 Under
federal law, one must comply with all maintenance re-
- Cases placing the causation burden of proof on the insurance company
rather than the insured party include Migues, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,257; Ameri-
can States, 456 F. Supp. at 970; Avemco, 388 F. Supp. at 151; Florida Power & Light,
433 So. 2d at 536-37; and Collins, 237 S.E.2d at 362. Colorado and Iowa place the
burden on the insured party. See supra note 22.
3 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409(2) (West 1984); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 515.101 (West 1949).
35 The text of the statute reads:
No breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, condition or
provision of any fire insurance policy, contract of insurance, or ap-
plications therefor, upon personal property, shall render void the
policy or contract or constitute a defense to a suit for loss thereon,
unless such breach or violation contributed to bring about the de-
struction of the property.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.14 (Vernon 1981).
- See Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 403 S.W.2d 499, 505
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Whisenant, 245 S.W.
963, 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Texas State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Richbourg, 243
S.W. 590, 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), rev'd on other grounds, 257 S.W. 1089 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1924); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Roan, 215 S.W. 985, 987 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919).
17 See Puckett, 378 S.W.2d at 938. The insurance company argued that several
previous Texas Supreme Court decisions had rejected the causation requirement,
but the majority opinion countered that the causation issue had never been raised
in those cases. Id.
• Id. at 937. The trial court rendered summary judgment for the insurance
company and the appellate court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Id.
.31 Id.
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quirements for a certificate to be effective.40 One mainte-
nance regulation requires an inspection within the twelve
months prior to operation of the plane.4I The annual in-
spection numbers among the hundreds of federal law re-
quirements for an effective airworthiness certificate.42
The parties stipulated that the inspection was not per-
formed, but that the failure to inspect the plane in no way
contributed to the accident.43 The court addressed only
the issue of whether the insured's breach of the inspection
requirement excused the insurance company from liability
under the policy absent a causal connection between the
breach and the crash.4 Rejecting the majority approach,
the court agreed with South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Collins
and other authorities that the causation requirement pro-
vides the better rule.45 The court looked to the Texas
personal property fire insurance statute as an indication
that denial of recovery because of a breach amounting to
a mere technicality would violate Texas' public policy.46
In so holding, the court expressly disapproved of the deci-
sion in Schepps Grocer Supply.47 Since the parties stipulated
to the lack of causation, the court never determined who
would have the burden of proof on the issue.48 However,
the two dissenting justices assumed that the burden of
proof would be on the insurance company.49
-0 Id; see 14 C.F.R. § 21.181(a)(1) (1987).
-i Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 937 n.1; see 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.165, 91.169 (1987).
-9 Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938; see Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, Re-
building and Alteration Requirements, 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.1 - 43.12 (1987); General
Operating and Flight Rules, 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.1 - 91.311 (1987).
-' Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 937. The crash apparently occurred through pilot er-
ror. I at 938.
4 Id. at 937.
45 Id at 937-38.
40 Id. at 938; see supra note 35 for the text of the statute. The court felt that it
would be unconscionable to allow the insurance company to avoid liability on the
basis of a technical breach because the cause of the crash, pilot error, was clearly
covered by the policy. Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938.
47 Id.; see supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schepps
Grocer Supply.
4m Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240; Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 937.
40Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 940 (Pope, CJ.,joined by McGee, J., dissenting). The
dissenters suggested that "[The majority] adds to the contract the requirement
589
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Around the time that it decided Puckett, the Texas
Supreme Court was considering the case of United States
Fire Insurance Co. v. Marr's Short Stop.50 United States Fire
Insurance Company sought to avoid liability under an avi-
ation insurance policy on the basis of a jury finding that
the pilot had breached the policy by knowingly flying into
weather conditions for which he had not obtained an FAA
rating.51 The court issued its original decision in Marr's
Short Stop, granting the insurance company the relief re-
quested, several months before Puckett.52 The court's de-
nial of the petition for rehearing, however, came more
than a month after the Puckett decision.53 A concurring
opinion and a dissenting opinion, added to the majority's
denial of rehearing, considered, among other issues, the
relevance of Puckett to the court's action in the case at
bar.54 The lone dissenter, Justice Ray, argued that Puckett
should apply and that the court should remand Marr's
Short Stop for a determination of whether the breach of the
aircraft policy was causally connected to the crash.55 The
dissenting opinion suggested that the burden of proving
that the breach contributed to the crash should be on the
insurance company.56 In response, Justice Spears, the au-
thor of Puckett, wrote a concurring opinion in which Jus-
that the insurance company must prove that the breach was the cause of the accident." Id
(emphasis added). With regard to the charge that the causation requirement adds
to the parties' agreement see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
- 680 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1984).
51 Id
'- See id. at 3; Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 936. Marr's Short Stop was decided on April
4, 1984. The Puckett decision came down on October 24, 1984, more than six
months later.
: See Marr's Short Stop, 680 S.W.2d at 3; Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 936. Rehearing
was denied in Marr's Short Stop on November 28, 1984, more than a month after
the October 24, 1984 decision in Puckett.
.' Marr's Short Stop, 680 S.W.2d at 6-11.
.. Id. at 11.
, Id. at 10. "Insurance coverage should not be denied Marr unless U.S.F.L
proves that Marr encountered IFR weather (Instrument Flight Rule weather re-
quires the pilot to fly in low visibility, relying on his instruments] and that his
failure to have an instrument rating was causally related to the crash." Id. (empha-
sis added).
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tice Kilgarlin joined. The concurrence argued that
Puckett should not apply to Marr's Short Stop because the
causation issue had not been preserved for appeal.58 The
concurring justices also contended that if Puckett applied,
the burden of proof should be on the insured party to
show that his breach of the policy did not contribute to
the loss.59
II. IDEAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. V. LAST DAYS
EVANGELICAL ASSOCIATION
A. Critical Analysis
Texas' rejection of the majority rule in Puckett set the
stage for Last Days, the first case to which the Puckett rule
applied.6 0 The Fifth Circuit found that the policy of insur-
ance unambiguously required Burmeister to have 1045
total logged hours of flying time.61 Last Days failed to
produce any evidence supporting the pilot form's claim
that Burmeister had logged 1045 hours. 2 Since the ac-
tual pilot had logged insufficient hours, he could not be
the Burmeister listed in the pilot clause.63 Therefore, the
court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the in-
sured had breached the policy.64
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit refused to affirm the
lower court's decision since, in its judgment, Texas law
after Puckett would not allow avoidance of coverage with-
- I at 6-7.
-" Id. at 7. The dissent disputes the assertion that the issue was not preserved
for review. Id. at 10.
$9 Id at 7. Though giving no explicit rationale, the concurring justices seem to
favor placing the burden of proof on the insured party because that party has
breached the policy. Id.
", The Fifth Circuit was asked to apply Pucet. in an earlier case but refused to
do so since the theory was not argued at trial and was not the subject of any
assignment of error on appeal. Royal Aviation, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
770 F.2d 1298, 1300 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985).
t" Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1238. In the court's words, "Unlike the deconstruc-
tionists at the forefront of modern literary criticism, the courts still recognize the
possibility of an unambiguous text." Id
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out a finding that Burmeister's failure to log 1045 hours
somehow contributed to the loss. 65 The court still faced
the open question of which party has the burden of proof
on causation, insurer or insured.6 6 As a federal court sit-
ting in diversity, the Fifth Circuit must apply the substan-
tive law of Texas, and burden of proof falls within state
substantive law. Since Puckett did not decide the burden
of proof issue, the Fifth Circuit had to predict what the
Texas Supreme Court would do in this situation.6 8
The court held that the Texas Supreme Court would
place the causation burden of proof on the insured
party,69 advancing two reasons for its opinion. First, the
author of Puckett had suggested putting the burden of
proof on the insured party in his concurring opinion in
Marr's Short Stop.70 Second, a well settled rule of Texas
law requires that when an insurance company pleads an
exclusion, the insured party must show that the exclusion
does not apply. 71 The court reasoned that placing the
6 Id. at 1240-41.
6 Id. at 1240.
d7 I The court cited to Benavides v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 516 F.2d 393, 400
(5th Cir. 1975), dealing with the Texas presumption against suicide in actions to
recover under life insurance policies, for the proposition that burden of proof is a
matter of state substantive law which a federal court sitting in diversity must
apply.
- Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240. On May 30, 1986, the Texas Supreme Court
adopted TEx. R. App. P. 114, allowing certification of questions by a United States
Court of Appeals when there exists "no controlling precedent in the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Texas." Unfortunately, the rule did not take effect until
January 1, 1987 and, thus, could not be used by the Fifth Circuit in Last Days.
Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240. The court said:
Although we might prefer to do otherwise, we believe that were the
Texas Supreme Court to address this question, it would place the
burden, as did Justice Spears concurring in Marr's Short Stop, on the
insured to prove that the failure to comply with the terms of the
policy in no way contributed to the loss.
Id.
70 Id. at 1240; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
" Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240. The court commented on the harshness of the
rule. Id. It has been challenged, but never with success. See, e.g., Hardware Deal-
ers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309, 316 (Tex. 1965). Essentially, the
only attempt to justify the rule is the statement that Texas courts construe exclu-
sions as "taking something out of the general portion of the contract, so that the
promise is to perform only what remains after the part excepted is taken away."
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burden of proving the policy breach contributed to the
loss on the insurance company would clash with this
rule.7 2 Requiring the insurer to demonstrate that the
breach of the exclusion contributed to the accident would
first obligate the insurer to show the existence of the ex-
cluded condition and, thereby, negate the insured's duty
to prove the exclusion inapplicable.73
The Fifth Circuit's prediction of the Texas Supreme
Court's future holding can be questioned on several
grounds. First, though two justices, including the author
of Puckett, suggested placing the burden of proof on the
insured, three other justices have either advocated or as-
sumed the application of the opposite rule.74 The two dis-
senters in Puckett assumed that the burden would be on
the insurance company. 75 Further, the dissenting justice
in Marr's Short Stop specifically suggested as much.76 Thus,
Justice Spears' opinion on the burden of proof issue could
well be a minority position on the Texas court.
The court's second argument also deserves scrutiny.
The court reasons correctly that requiring the insurer to
show that an excluded risk contributed to the loss would
conflict with the Texas rule that the insured has the bur-
den of proof on the initial applicability of an exclusion."
Logically, if an insurance company must prove that the
breach of the policy contributed to the loss, it must first
prove that the policy was breached. 78 This relieves the in-
sured's burden of demonstrating that the exclusion does
Ia (quoting Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harris, 212 S.W. 933 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1919)). This view is contrasted with the position that exclusions are defensive in
nature, "added to the principal contract to avoid the promise of the insurer by
way of defeasance or excuse." Id.; see infra note 80.
72 Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240.
73 Id at 1240-41.
7- See supra notes 49 and 56 and accompanying text for relevant passages from
the opinions in Puckett and Mart's Short Stop.
', See supra note 49 for the relevant passage from the dissenting opinion.
- See supra note 56 for the relevant portion of Justice Ray's dissent.
" See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text, setting out the court's
reasoning.
- Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240-41.
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not apply.79 However, the important question remains.
Would this conflict keep the Texas Supreme Court from
placing the burden of proof of causation on the insurer?
For several reasons, the inconsistency might not trouble
the Texas courts as much as it did the Fifth Circuit. First,
the rule requiring the insured to negate exclusions pled
by the insurer does not appear to implicate important
public policies. 80 In Hardware Dealer's Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Berglund,"' a party asked the Texas Supreme Court to
overturn the rule. The court declined to do so, not to
protect some cherished value, but merely because it did
not wish to disturb a long line of precedent supporting
the rule. 2 However, in light of the radical changes the
Texas Supreme Court made in Puckett, the rule of stare
decisis might not be as influential as in 1965, the year of
the Berglund decision. The Texas Supreme Court might
be willing to overrule Berglund, at least for aviation insur-
ance policies, since the rules relating to such policies are
currently in flux. 8 3
Second, the rule set forth in Berglund has generally been
- See id.
so The court in Last Days sets out in a footnote the justification for the rule,
quoting from an old Texas case also cited by Berglund:
Those courts which treat the contracts as being general, and the
clauses declaring what they shall not cover as "stipulations added to
the principal contract to avoid the promise of the insurer by way of
defeasance or excuse," hold that these clauses are defensive, and
must be pleaded and sustained by the insurer; while the courts which
construe the exception clauses as "taking something out of the gen-
eral portion of the contract, so that the promise is to perform only
what remains after the part excepted is taken away," place the bur-
den of pleading and proof upon the assured to negative them by
showing that his cause of action does not come within the exception.
In view of the decisions by our Supreme Court, and the indication
made in granting the writ in this case, we are of the opinion that the
burden rests upon the plaintiff to show that her cause of action does
not fall within the excepting clause.
Id. at 1240 n.8 (quoting Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harris, 212 S.W. 933 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1919)).
a, 393 S.W.2d 309 (rex. 1965).
0 Id. at 315.
K.1 The Berglund court justified adherence to the rule on the grounds that busi-
nessmen require a great deal of stability in contract law. Id. It is difficult to see
how an insurance company would rely on a rule of pleading in entering insurance
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
ignored in Texas cases applying article 6.14 of the Insur-
ance Code, requiring that breaches of certain fire insur-
ance policies contribute to the loss for the insurance
company to avoid liability.84 For instance, in Austin Build-
ing Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,85 the insurer
pled an exclusion because the building destroyed by fire
had been occupied in violation of the policy.86 The Texas
appellate court reversed and remanded a lower court de-
cision for the insurance company because there was "no
evidence whatever that occupancy of the extension con-
tributed to the fire."8 7 Thus, the court implicitly placed
the burden of proving causation on the insurer. Other
cases applying article 6.14 have done so explicitly."" None
of these Texas courts even mentioned the inconsistency
with the longstanding rule affirmed in Berglund.
Third, all the authorities cited by the Texas Supreme
Court in Puckett as persuasive, if they address the issue at
all, place the burden of proving causation on the insur-
ance company rather than the insured. 9 For instance,
South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Collins,9" cited twice in the
Puckett opinion,91 so held. Even though Justice Spears
would not follow these cases on the burden of proof issue,
they might influence other justices. In fact, there appear
to be only two jurisdictions, other than the Fifth Circuit in
Last Days, which place on the insured party the burden of
proving that the breach of an aviation insurance policy did
contracts. However, the business reliance justification for keeping the rule be-
comes less persuasive given the disruptive holding of Puckett.
it See supra notes 35 and 3J6 for the text of the statute and a list of cases applying
it.
HS 403 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
A7 Id
" See supra note 36 and accompanying text for cases applying the statute and
putting the burden of proof on the insurer.
" See supra note 33 for cases which place the burden of proof on the insurance
company. These cases were cited in Puckett, with the exception of the Florida Power
& Light decision.
- See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 33; Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 937-38.
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not contribute to the loss. 92 In practical terms, the Fifth
Circuit has predicted that the Texas Supreme Court
would defy the weight of authority on this issue.93
B. Practical Implications
The decision in Last Days first applies the rule of Puckett
and first decides who will bear the burden of proof of cau-
sation.94 Of course, the opinion will have effect only until
the Texas Supreme Court addresses the issue. Until that
time, the Fifth Circuit's opinion will bind lower federal
courts in Texas.95 Last Days will also be persuasive in
lower Texas state courts and might influence the Texas
Supreme Court's ultimate decision on the burden of
proof issue.
Generally, the decision will require insured parties in-
volved in litigation to prove what caused a particular air-
craft crash, or at least what did not cause it. In remanding
this case for trial, the Fifth Circuit held that "[Last Days]
must prove that pilot error was not a cause of the
crash."9 6 Since, to bar recovery, pilot error need only be
one of several causes of the crash, proving that there was
a mechanical malfunction, or even that the wings fell off,
might not meet the insured's burden of proof.97
This burden might not be too onerous for a large air-
line or airplane manufacturer. In such cases, the company
would probably test for the cause of the crash regardless
of the litigation. 8 However, for an insured individual, the
lm See supra note 22 for a discussion of O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696
P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985) and IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 1949).
0.1 See supra note 33 for a list of five cases placing the burden of proof on the
insurer as opposed to two jurisdictions placing it on the insured.
"' Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1240-41.
See, e.g., Russell v. Hathaway, 423 F. Supp. 833, 835 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (even a
three-judge district court bound by circuit court opinions).
-, Last Days, 783 F.2d at 1241.
1,7 See Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938 ("[Ain insurer cannot avoid liability under an
aviation liability policy unless [the breach] is either the sole or one of several
causes of the accident.").
-' See, e.g., A Grisly Triptych of Disasters, TIME, Sept. 27, 1982, at 43 (McDonnell
Douglas experts study cause of crash); Hill, U.S. Air Carrier Accident Investigation
Procedure, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 414 (1970). National Transportation Safety Board
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costs of gathering evidence to prove that exclusions pled
by the insurance company did not contribute to the crash
might discourage risking such expenses to pursue litiga-
tion. In some cases, insurance companies may escape
paying out on policies where coverage actually exists.
However, even after Last Days, insured parties remain in a
better position than they occupied before Puckett.99 An in-
sured party who has breached some technical policy pro-
vision still has a chance to recover, since Last Days
requires the trial court to find that the policy breach con-
tributed to the crash before the insurance company can
avoid coverage. 100
Where the cause of an accident cannot be deter-
mined, 10 ' Last Days will allow an insurer to avoid liability
on any applicable exclusion, because the insured party
will be unable to prove the breach did not contribute to
the crash. Essentially, if the cause of the crash remains a
mystery, the Puckett causation requirement will not benefit
the insured party. 0 2 In closely contested cases, the bur-
den of proof also carries with it the risk of nonpersuasion,
and insured parties will lose when a court cannot decide
between the causation analyses of the litigants. 03
III. CONCLUSION
Arguably, the Fifth Circuit may have erred in its predic-
tion of what the Texas Supreme Court will do with the
regulations make it possible for parties involved in an accident to participate in
the official post-accident investigation. 49 C.F.R. § 831.9(a) (1986).
See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Puckett.
to" See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Last Days that the Puckett decision required reversal of the ini-
tial judgment for Ideal.
lot See, e.g., Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, 255 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1958)
(neither party able to prove cause of crash); Kelley v. Central Nat'l Bank, 345 F.
Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1972) (no evidence to show cause of crash).
' Where the cause of the crash remains undetermined, the insurer can just
plead various exclusions under the policy and the insured party will not recover
unless it can show the exclusions do not apply. This matches the state of Texas
law before Puckett.
,0- See, e.g., 32B AM. JUR. 2D, Federal Rules of Evidence § 58 (1982) which treats
"burden of proof" and "risk of nonpersuasion" as synonyms.
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causation burden of proof. Strong arguments exist for
either position, and the court ruled on what appeared to it
the best evidence. Indeed, the opinion suggests that the
court might have preferred to hold otherwise. 10 4 Thus,
commendably, the Fifth Circuit panel placed fidelity to
the law over personal preference. The Texas Supreme
Court's actual holding on the burden of proof issue will
provide the ultimate test of the Fifth Circuit's analysis.
Regardless of what the Texas Supreme Court eventu-
ally holds, the Fifth Circuit in Last Days has, for the pres-
ent, limited the benefits of Puckett for parties insured
under aviation policies.'0" Where the cause of a crash
cannot be determined, the holding in Puckett will be en-
tirely annulled by the Fifth Circuit's opinion, because the
insurance company can avoid liability by pleading any rel-
evant exclusion. 106 Until the Texas Supreme Court rules
on the issue, counsel representing the insured party
under an aviation insurance policy should assume that
they will have to prove that any exclusion pled by the in-
surance company either does not apply or did not contrib-
ute to the accident.
J. Randy Beck
-o, See supra note 14.
1o See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practi-
cal implications of the decision.
'oC See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
[53
Current
Literature

